Colleges need to have skin in the game to tackle student loan debt

Published in The Hill.

Republican Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee rightly wants to make colleges more accountable for the results of student loans. With these federal loans, the government lends with no credit underwriting, the students get in debt, but who gets all the money? The colleges. If the students fail to repay the loans, who takes the hit? The taxpayers. This is a perverse incentive structure. It leads to, as his committee report found, “nearly half of all borrowers not making payments on their student loans.”

Alexander proposes a “new accountability system for colleges based upon whether borrowers are actually repaying their student loans.” Great idea! In a similar vein, the annual White House budget correctly observes a “better system would require postsecondary institutions that accept taxpayer funds to share in the financial responsibility associated with student loans.” Indeed, each college should share the risk of whether its students repay the money they borrowed and the college spent. Nothing improves your behavior like having to share in the risk you are creating. In his book “Skin in the Game,” Nassim Nicholas Taleb wrote, “If you inflict risk on others, and they are harmed, you need to pay some price for it.”

In student loans, with their abysmal repayment rate, colleges play the same role as subprime mortgage brokers did in the infamous housing finance bubble. They promote the loans without regard to how they might be repaid, they make money from the loans, and they pass all the risk on to somebody else. In the housing finance case, the risk went ultimately to the taxpayers. In the student loan case, it goes directly to the taxpayers. Just as the flow of easy mortgage credit induces higher house prices then takes even more debt to pay the higher price, the flow of easy student credit induces higher college prices then takes even more debt to pay the higher tuition. It is a sweet deal for colleges that create the risk, keep all the money, and stick the taxpayers with all the losses.

A Brookings Institution research paper points out that with low repayment rates, the federal student loan program represents a “sizeable taxpayer funded transfer” to the colleges. It rightly asks how much of the taxpayer losses the college should have to pay back. It proposes that each cohort of college borrowers be measured at the end of five years of required payments, and each college has to pay at least 25 percent of the amount by which the actual principal reduction has fallen short of 20 percent of the total of the original loans after five years. The 20 percent principal reduction results from what would happen with a 15 year amortization of the loan pool as the standard used. That seems perfectly reasonable.

This proposal is a good stab at it, but I would say do not wait for five years to address the problem. Do it every year. Take the total loan pool of each borrower cohort of the college. Establish a 15 year amortization schedule for the principal of the pool. Measure every year how much principal has actually been paid in the pool as a whole. Each year the college should pay to the Treasury, I suggest 20 percent of any repayment shortfall against the standard. That would be a steady financial feedback loop.

After 15 years, the college will have reimbursed taxpayers for 20 percent of whatever loan principal was not paid. Of course, taxpayers would still be paying for 80 percent of the losses. The 20 percent loss participation would be enough to give the college the right incentives to improve its repayment performance and control instead of constantly bloating the debt of its students. Student loan borrowers, like mortgage borrowers, are hurt being saddled with thousands of dollars in debt they cannot pay.

Colleges should have maximum flexibility for how to work on this. They could increase efficiency, reduce their costs and their prices, or shorten the time to graduation to scale back the need for borrowing. They should make sure the students understand what loans mean and how they are expected to repay, consider their ability to pay, guide the students to programs with the most promising job prospects for them, and adjust their mix of programs. They can do all of the above plus other ideas and managing the tradeoffs involved. Colleges should no longer play the role of subprime mortgage brokers. They need some skin in the game now.

Cuestionan definición de servicios esenciales

Published in Metro PR.

Amanda Rivera, directora ejecutiva del Instituto del Desarrollo de la Juventud de Puerto Rico; Ana Cristina Gómez, profesora de la Escuela de Derecho de la Universidad de Puerto Rico (UPR), y Alex Pollock, del R Street Institute, también presentaron sus ponencias ante el comité cameral.

Demócratas y republicanos parecen ir por caminos distintos sobre la ley Promesa

Published in El Nuevo Dia.

El experto en finanzas Alex Pollock, del grupo R Street y quien fue invitado a la audiencia por la minoría republicana, recomendó que la JSF tenga más poderes y pidió al Congreso nombrar un jefe de finanzas que también funcione por encima del gobierno electo de Puerto Rico.

Como varios congresistas republicanos, Pollock criticó que el gobierno de Puerto Rico no haya publicado los informes financieros auditados de 2016, 2017 y 2018.

U.S House Natural Resources Committee Holds Hearing on Puerto Rico

Published in The Weekly Journal.

The U.S. House Committee on Natural Resources holds a hearing today on the status of Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA): Lessons Learned Three Years Later.

Natural Resources committee Chairman Raúl Grijalva presides the 10 a.m. oversight hearing at the Longworth House Office Building.

Gov. Ricardo Rosselló, Natalie A. Jaresko, Executive Director, Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico; Martín Guzmán, Non-Resident Senior Fellow for Fiscal Policy, Espacios Abiertos; Amanda Rivera, Executive Director, The Institute for Youth Development of Puerto Rico; Ana Cristina Gómez-Pérez, Associate Professor, University of Puerto Rico; and Alex J. Pollock, Distinguished Senior Fellow, R Street Institute are part of the witness list.

Testimony to the House Committee on Natural Resources at Hearing on “The Status of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA): Lessons Learned Three Years Later”

Published by the R Street Institute.

Six Lessons

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bishop, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today.  I am Alex Pollock, a senior fellow at the R Street Institute, and these are my personal views.  I have spent almost five decades working in and on the banking and financial system, including studying the recurring insolvencies of municipal and sovereign governments.  I have personally experienced and studied numerous financial crises and their political aftermaths, and have authored many articles, presentations, testimony and two books on related subjects.  Prior to R Street, I was a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute 2004-2016, and President and CEO of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago 1991-2004.

In my view, there are six key lessons about PROMESA, the massive insolvency of the government of Puerto Rico, and the role of the Oversight Board we should consider.  These are:

1. The fundamental bargain of PROMESA was sound. But it could be improved.

2. In such situations, a lot of conflict and controversy is unavoidable and certain.

3. The Oversight Board should have more power: in particular, it should have the same Chief Financial Officer provisions as were so successfully used in the Washington DC reforms.

4. Oversight boards are likely to last more than three years. In Puerto Rico, all the problems were of course made more difficult by the destructive hurricanes, and the flow of federal emergency funds into the Puerto Rican economy now makes the financial problems more complex.

5. Large unfunded pensions are a central element in these situations and set up an inescapable conflict between the claims of bondholders and pensioners.

6. Progress must operate on three levels of increasing difficulty:

7. Equitable reorganization of the debt (including pension debt)

8. Reform for efficiency and reliability in the fiscal and financial functioning of the government

9. Reforms which allow a growing, enterprising successful market economy to emerge from the historic government-centric economy.

1. The fundamental bargain of PROMESA was sound. But it could be improved.

As it considered PROMESA, the Congress was faced with a municipal insolvency of unprecedented size.  As one analyst correctly wrote, “There is no municipal borrower remotely as insolvent as Puerto Rico.”  Indeed, adding together its $70 billion in bond debt and $50 or $60 billion in unfunded pension debt, the government of Puerto Rico has debt of more than six times that of the City of Detroit, the previous all-time record holder, as it entered bankruptcy.

The fundamental bargain Congress constructed in PROMESA to cope with Puerto Rico’s financial crisis made and makes good sense.  It may be described as follows:

     -To the Puerto Rican government:  We will provide reduction and restructuring of your unpayable debts, but only if it is accompanied by fundamental financial and government reform.

     -To the creditors:  You will get an appointed board to oversee and reform Puerto Rico’s finances, but only if it also has debt reduction powers.

This is a sound bargain.  The resulting Oversight Board created by the act was and is, in my judgment, absolutely necessary.  But its members, serving without pay, were as we all know, given an extremely difficult responsibility.  So far, significant progress has been made, but much remains to do.  Let us hope the Senate promptly confirms the existing members of the Board, so that its work may continue uninterrupted.

In the negotiations leading to PROMESA, it was decided to create an Oversight Board, less powerful than a control board.  I thought at the time, and it seems clear in retrospect, that it would have been better—and would still be better–for it to have more of the powers of a financial control board, as discussed further under Lesson 3.

Two well-known cases of very large municipal insolvencies in which financial control boards were successfully used were those of New York City and Washington DC.  In 1975, New York City was unable to pay its bills or keep its books straight, having relied on, as one history says, “deceptive accounting, borrowing excessively, and refusing to plan.”  In 1995, Washington was similarly unable to pay its vendors or provide basic services, being mired in deficits, debt and financial incompetence. 

Today, New York City has S&P/Moody’s bonds ratings of AA/Aa1, and Washington DC of AA+/Aaa.  We should hope for similar success with the financial recovery of Puerto Rico.

• In such situations, a lot of conflict and controversy is unavoidable and certain.

Nothing is less surprising than that the actions and decisions of the Oversight Board have created controversy and criticism, or that “the board has spent years at odds with unhappy creditors in the mainland and elected officials on the island.”

As one Oversight Board member, David Skeel, has written, the Board “had been sharply criticized by nearly everyone.  Many Puerto Ricans and economists…argued that our economic projections were far too optimistic….  Creditors…insisted that the economic assumptions in the fiscal plan were unduly pessimistic and…provided too little money for repayment.”

The settlement of defaults, reorganization of debt and creation of fiscal discipline is of necessity passing out losses and pain, accompanied by intense negotiations.  Of course, everyone would like someone else to bear more of the loss and themselves less.  It is utterly natural in the “equitable reorganization of debt” for insolvent debtors and the creditors holding defaulted debt to have differing views of what is “equitable.”

If only one side were critical of the Oversight Board, it would not be doing its job.  If it is operating as it should, both sides will complain, as will both ends of the political spectrum.  In this, I believe we must judge the Oversight Board successful.

The financial control boards of New York City and Washington DC are now rightly considered as a matter of history to have been very successful and to have made essential contributions to the recovery of their cities.  But both generated plenty of complaints, controversy, protests and criticism in their time.

In Washington, for example, “city workers protested by blocking the Control Board’s office with garbage trucks during the morning rush hour.”  In the board’s first meeting, “protesters shouted ‘Free D.C.’ throughout the meeting, which was brought to an end by a bomb threat.”  Later, “in one of its most controversial actions, the Board fired the public school superintendent, revoked most of the school board’s powers, and appointed its own superintendent to lead the system.”

In New York, the board “made numerous painful, controversial decisions that the administration of Mayor Abraham D. Beame was unwilling or unable to make.  It ordered hundreds of millions of dollars in budget cuts above those proposed by the administration and demanded the layoffs of thousands of additional city workers.  It rejected a contract negotiated by the city’s Board of Education…it also rejected a transit workers’ contract.”

What did this look like at the time?  “In the eyes of many people in the city, it was most distasteful,” said Hugh Carey, then Governor of New York State.  “They saw the control board as the end of home rule, as the end of self-government.”  Another view: “The city of New York was like an indentured servant.”

In restructurings of debt and fiscal operations, it has been well observed that a “key factor is making sure that the sacrifice is distributed fairly.”  But what is fair is necessarily subject to judgment and inevitably subject to dispute.

• The Oversight Board should have more power: in particular it should have the same Chief Financial Officer provisions as were so successfully used in the Washington DC financial reforms.

As PROMESA came into effect, as has been observed, “The most obvious obstacle…was that no one really knew what Puerto Rico’s revenues and expenditures were.” This financial control mess, stressed by expert consultants at the time, highlights the central role in both creating and fixing the debt crisis, of financial management, reporting and controls.  Progress had been made here with efforts of both the Oversight Board and Puerto Rico, as the certified fiscal plan has been developed.  But the government of Puerto Rico still has not completed its audited financial statements for 2016 or 2017, let alone 2018.

Of the historical instances of financial control boards in municipal insolvencies, there is a key parallel between Puerto Rico and Washington DC:  in both cases, there is no intervening state. The key role played by New York State, or by Michigan in the Detroit bankruptcy, for example, is missing. The reform and restructuring relationship is directly between the U.S. Congress and the local government.

The most striking difference between the Washington DC board and the Oversight Board is the greater power of the former.  This was true in the initial design in 1995, but when Congress revised the structure in 1997 legislation, the Washington board was made even stronger.  Most notably, the Washington design included the statutory Office of the Chief Financial Officer, which answered primarily to the control board and was independent of the mayor.  Puerto Rico has created its own Chief Financial Officer, as good idea as far as it goes, but it lacks the reporting relationship to the Oversight Board and the independence which were fundamental to the Washington reforms. 

Today, long after Washington’s financial recovery, the independence remains.  As explained by the current Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) itself:

“In 1995, President Clinton signed the law creating a presidentially appointed District of Columbia Financial Control Board…. The same legislation…also created the position of Chief Financial Officer, which had direct control over day-to-day financial operations of each District agency and independence from the Mayor’s office.  In this regard, the CFO is nominated by the Mayor and approved by the DC Council, after which the nomination is transmitted to the U.S. Congress for a thirty-day review period.

“The 2005 District of Columbia Omnibus Authorization Act…reasserted the independence and authority of the OCFO after the Control Board had become a dormant administrative agency on September 30, 2001, following four consecutive years of balanced budgets and clean audits.”

If PROMESA were ever to be revised, for example trading additional financial support for additional reform and financial controls, as happened in the Washington DC case in 1997, I believe the revision should include structuring an Office of the Chief Financial Officer for Puerto Rico on the Washington DC model.

• Oversight boards are likely to last more than three years. In Puerto Rico, all the problems were of course made more difficult by the hurricanes, and the flow of emergency funds into the Puerto Rican economy now makes the financial problems more complex.

As we come up on the third anniversaries of PROMESA and the Oversight Board, we can reflect on how long it may take to complete the Oversight Board’s responsibilities of debt reorganization and financial and fiscal reform.  More than three years.

The New York City control board functioned from 1975 to 1986, or eleven years.  There was a milestone in 1982, which was the resumption of bank purchases of its municipal bonds. That took seven years.

The Washington DC control board operated from 1995 to 2001, or six years.  (Both boards still remain in the wings, capable of resuming activity, should the respective cities backslide in their financial disciplines.)

Everything in the Puerto Rico financial crisis was made more uncertain and difficult by the destruction from the disastrous hurricanes of 2017.  Now, as in response, large amounts of federal disaster aid are flowing into the Puerto Rican economy. 

How much this aid should be is of course a hotly debated political issue.  But whatever it turns out to be, this external flow makes the formation of the long-term fiscal plan more complex.  Whether the total disaster relief is the $82 billion was estimated by the Oversight Board, the $41 billion calculated as so far approved, or some other number, it is economically a large intermediate-term stimulus relative to the Puerto Rican economy, with its GDP of approximately $100 billion.

There are significant issues of how effectively and efficiently such sums will be spent, what the economic boost will be as they generate spending, employment and government revenues, whether they can result in sustainable growth or only a temporary effect, and therefore how they will affect the long-term solvency and debt-repayment capacity of the government of Puerto Rico.  Even if none of these funds go to direct debt payment, their secondary effects on government revenues may.  How to think through all this is not clear (at least to me), but a conservative approach to making long-term commitments based on short-term emergency flows does seem advisable.

The Oversight Board will have to come up with some defined approach to both long and short-term outlooks, as it continues its double project of debt reorganization and fiscal reform.  That is yet another difficult assignment for them, requiring time and generating controversy.

• Large unfunded pensions are a central element in these situations and set up an inescapable conflict between the claims of bondholders and pensioners.

Puerto Rican government pension plans are not only underfunded, they are basically unfunded.  At the time a PROMESA, a generally used estimate of the pension debt was $50 billion, which added to the $70 billion in bond debt made $120 billion in all.  It appears that there is in addition $10 billion in unfunded liabilities of government corporations and municipalities, making the pension debt $60 billion, and thus the total debt, before reorganization haircuts, $130 billion.  As I learned from an old banker long ago, in bankruptcy, assets shrink and liabilities expand.

How are the competing claims of bondholders and pensioners equitably to be settled?  This is an ever-growing issue in municipal and state finances—very notably in Illinois and Chicago, for example, as well as plainly in Puerto Rico.  The bankruptcy settlement of the City of Detroit did give haircuts to pensions—a very important precedent, in which the state constitution of Michigan was trumped by federal bankruptcy law.  But the pensions turned out in Detroit, as elsewhere, to be de facto senior to all unsecured bond debt. This reflects the political force of the pensioners’ claims and needs.

On April 30, the Oversight Board demanded that the government of Puerto Rico act to enforce required contributions to pension funds from several public entities and municipalities.  It is “unacceptable to withhold retirement contributions from an employee and not immediately transfer that money into the individual retirement account where it belongs,” wrote our colleague on the panel, Natalie Jaresco.  She is right, of course.  Except that it is worse than “unacceptable”—it is theft.

Pensions as a huge component of municipal insolvencies will continue to be a tough issue for the Oversight Board, as well as for a lot of other people.

• Progress must operate on three levels of increasing difficulty:

• Equitable reorganization of the debt (including pension debt)

• Reform for efficiency and reliability in the fiscal and financial functioning of the government

• Reforms which allow a growing, enterprising successful market economy to emerge from the historic government-centric economy.

Three years into the process, the first of these requirements is difficult and controversial, but well under way.

The second is harder, because it is challenging government structures, embedded practices, power, and local politics.  Relative to addressing insolvency, the most important areas for reform are of course the financial and fiscal functions.  Reform would be advanced by the creation of an Office of the Chief Financial Officer on the Washington DC model.

The third problem is by far the most difficult.  Solving the first two will help make solving the third possible, but the question of how to do this is not yet answered, subject to competing theories, and major uncertainty.  We all must hope for the people of Puerto Rico that it will nonetheless happen.

Thank you again for the chance to share these views.

Federal Lending to Insolvent Pension Plans Is Code for Bailout

Published in Real Clear Markets.

Here’s a remarkable lending opportunity to consider:  Let’s make billions of dollars in loans to borrowers which “are insolvent” or in “critical or declining status.”  These loans would be unsecured and no payments of principal would be due for 30 years.  At that point, in case of default, the loans would be forgiven.  Would you make such a loan?  Obviously not, and neither would anybody else—except maybe the government.   This idea is one only politicians could love, since it gives them a way to spend the taxpayers’ money without calling it spending.

Making such loans is proposed in a bill before the House Ways and Means Committee, entitled “Rehabilitation for Multiemployer Pensions Act” (HR 397). The borrowers would be multiemployer (union) pension funds which are deeply underfunded, insolvent in the sense of having obligations much greater than their assets, and won’t have the money to pay the benefits they have promised.  A more forthright title for the bill would be the “Taxpayer Bailout of Multiemployer Pension Funds Act.”

The bill’s primary sponsor, Congressman Richard Neal (D-MA), who is Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, has stated, “This is not a bailout.”  But a bailout by any other name is still a bailout.  “These plans would be required by law to pay back the loans they receive,” said Chairman Neal.  But the bill itself provides on pp.18-19:

          “(e) LOAN DEFAULT.—If a plan is unable to make any payment on a loan under this section when due, the Pension Rehabilitation Administration [PRA] shall negotiate with the plan sponsor revised terms for repayment, which may include…forgiveness of a portion of the loan principal.”

No limit is set on how big the “portion” may be.  Why not 100%?  Of course, all loans of all kinds are in principle required to be repaid, but are nonetheless not repaid if the borrower becomes insolvent, and pension funds demonstrably can go broke like anybody else.  As one actuary recently observed, “It seems very likely that the default rate on PRA loans will be significant.”  Indeed it does.

It is highly convenient for the politicians that under the bill no default on principal repayment could occur by definition until the balloon payment in 30 years.  Assuming defaults start to occur in 2050, a member of Congress who is now 60 years old would be 91, if still living.  “I’ll gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today,” said the instructive cartoon character, Wimpy.  Likewise, “We’ll gladly pay in 30 years for a bailout today” is a natural human response to financial failure.

Chairman Neal said that with his bill, “The federal government is simply backstopping the risk.”  But the federal government is already backstopping the risk of these pension plans through its implicit guarantee of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 

How has that worked out?  The PBGC’s insurance program for multiemployer pension funds is itself broke.  Its net worth is a negative $54 billion, according to the PBGC’s 2018 annual report.  The net position of $54 billion in the hole is composed of total assets of only $2.3 billion and liabilities of $56 billion, thus the liabilities are 24 times the assets.  Since PBGC’s accounting only takes into account the budget window, its long term position is even worse.

So it is not a surprise that by the time you get to the last paragraph on the last page of the bill, you find it also includes a bailout of the PBGC’s failing multiemployer program:

     “(b) APPROPRIATIONS.—There is appropriated to the Director of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation such sums as may be necessary for each fiscal year.” 

These sums are for direct financial assistance from the PBGC to “critical and declining” and “insolvent” multiemployer pension plans.  There is virtually no limit to the amount (“such sums as may be necessary”) or the time (“for each fiscal year”) of these appropriations.  They are for sending cash in addition to the loans from the bill’s proposed Pension Rehabilitation Administration.  Also on its last page, the bill provides that the PBGC “shall not require the financial assistance to be repaid before the date on which the [PRA] loan…is repaid in full.”  That may be never.  The Congressional Budget Office estimated the probable taxpayer cost of a similar previous bill at more than $100 billion.

In theory and under its Congressional charter, the PBGC was supposed to be a financially stand-alone, actuarially sound insurance company, not guaranteed by the government and never needing any appropriated funds.  As its annual report says, “PBGC receives no funds from taxpayer dollars.”  Not yet, anyway.  The PBGC has always had an implicit guaranty from the U.S. Treasury, and we can once again observe that implicit government guarantees tend to become bailouts.

In short, the bill is a convoluted way to a simple end: to have the taxpayers pay the pensions promised but not funded by the multiemployer plans.  If enacted, the bill will encourage other plans to make new unfunded promises in the very logical expectation of future additional bailouts.

To adapt a famous line of the great philosopher and economist, David Hume, “It would scarcely be more imprudent to give a prodigal son a credit in every banker’s shop in London than to give a politician the ability to guarantee pension plans.”

Asset Managers Should Not Vote Shares They Don’t Own

Published in The Wall Street Journal.

“Maybe it is time for the SEC to require index funds to poll their investors and vote their shares only as specifically directed,” say Phil Gramm and Michael Solon (“Enemies of the Economic Enlightenment,” op-ed, April 16). They are so right, except it is not “maybe,” it’s time, period.

Asset managers should not be able to vote the shares they do not own to pursue their political notions or business purposes. Instead, they should be able to vote only when instructed by the real owners. That means voting by the principals, not by the agents. In this way, the asset managers would be treated exactly like the broker-dealers who control huge numbers of shares registered in street name, but must ask the real owners how to vote. It is indeed high time for the SEC to fix this very troubling anomaly in corporate governance.

Pollock participates in a discussion with Professor Mark H. Rose

Hosted by the American Enterprise Institute.

R Street Distinguished Senior Fellow Alex J. Pollock took part in a March 27 panel at the American Enterprise Institute to discuss economic historian Mark Rose’s new book, “Market Rules: Bankers, Presidents, and the Origins of the Great Recession.” Other panelists were Rose himself, Richard Sylla of the National Bureau of Economic Research and moderator Paul H. Kupiec of AEI.

Thoughts on the Source of International Economic Advantage

Published in Real Clear Markets.

What are the possible sources of America’s international economic advantages and success at creating a superior standard of living for its people?  Each fundamental factor of production gives rise to a potential competitive advantage.  According to the classic list of Adam Smith, these factors are Land, Labor and Capital.  A more compete list would contain five fundamental factors:

1.       Natural Resources

2.       Labor

3.       Capital

4.       Knowledge

5.       Social Infrastructure.

In the revised list, Natural Resources is a more general version of Land.  Labor must be understood to include the essential element of education, as well as a crucial kind of labor: that of the entrepreneur.  Capital is what allows risks to be taken and economic growth to accumulate.  Knowledge most importantly means science and its offspring, technology of all kinds.  Knowledge also includes knowing how to manage large, complex organizations.  Social Infrastructure means the laws, property rights, financial practices, enforcement of contracts, culture friendly to enterprise, the lack of stifling or corrupt bureaucracy, and the essential political stability that together allow markets, including financial markets, to function well.

Historically, America had important advantages in all five fundamental factors, leading to its establishment by 1920, a hundred years ago, as the dominant economy in the world.  But global development, a very good thing for mankind in general, makes it harder to maintain America’s former advantages.  This suggests the U.S. political economy will be continuingly challenged at how to provide higher pay than elsewhere in the world—otherwise known as a higher standard of living.  It means we have less room than before for subsidizing political drag.

In the global competition of the ongoing 21st century, America no longer has as great an advantage as it previously did in the first four factors, but a continuing and central advantage in the fifth.  This advantage, however, can be weakened by unwise politics and bureaucracy.

Let us consider each of the factors in turn in a globalized world.

1. Natural Resources.  Commodities trade actively in world markets, move among countries with very low transportation costs, historically speaking, and are available almost everywhere.  Being a natural resources-rich country, as the U.S. is, matters less than before.  For example, making Land more productive by the scientific agriculture of the 19th century, as symbolized by the institution of land grant colleges, and by the continuing advances in agricultural science since then, is available everywhere in the world.

2. Labor.  The great historical revolution of public education has spread around the world, while the struggles of large parts of U.S. public education are well known.  The ability to organize and manage large, capital-intensive enterprises to make labor productive has also spread around the world.  Large pools of educated, technically proficient labor are increasingly available, notably in China and India.  Napoleon thought China a sleeping giant and recommended not waking it up.  Now we have two giants awake, as well as other countries, with increasingly educated labor.  If America wants to provide higher pay than they do for work with the same level of education, this must be based on a different fundamental advantage.

3. Capital.  Capital is essential to all risk-bearing, economic growth and productivity.  Savings available for investment as capital now flow quickly around the world, seeking and finding the best opportunities wherever they may be.  While capital is raised and employed in huge amounts in the U.S., we are not the leaders in savings.

4. Knowledge.  The incredible economic revolution of the last 250 years, or modernization, which empowered first Britain, then Western Europe and America with vast leadership advantages, has as its most fundamental source science based on mathematics.  Scientific Knowledge, turned to technology and harnessed to production by entrepreneurial energy, then matched with learning how to manage large organizations, created the modern world.  Mathematical science began as a monopoly of Europe and America, but is now the most cosmopolitan of human achievements.  America has world-leading research capabilities, including top research universities, but Knowledge is now available everywhere and incorporated into international scientific endeavor.

5. Social Infrastructure.  The political stability, clear property rights and safety of America have long served to attract investment as a safe haven and supported the role of the U.S. dollar as the dominant reserve currency.  By designing a stable political order which continued to work for an extremely large republic, the American Founding Fathers also created a powerful economic competitive advantage.  This advantage was augmented when Europe destroyed itself in the First World War, and New York replaced London as the center of world capital markets, and when Europe again destroyed itself in the Second World War.  This key advantage continues and helps explain how the U.S. can finance its continuous trade and budget deficits.  It may be an “exorbitant privilege” as viewed from France, but it is one earned by superior Social Infrastructure.

As John Makin instructively wrote a decade ago, “The fact that global savers accommodate U.S. consumers…is simply a manifestation of America’s competitive advantage at supplying wealth management services.”

This advantage in wealth storage, reflecting an advantage of Social Infrastructure, yields not only economic, but also large political and military benefits.  But no competitive strength is incapable of being lost over time, as former world economic leader Britain found out.  The strongest advantages can be weakened by political, bureaucratic, legal and regulatory drag.  The constant effort to maintain these advantages also maintains the ability to pay more for work than other countries do.

This Week in Financial Regulation, March 6th

Published in the Captured Economy.

The American Interest gives the history of the banking industry since the 1950s. As the Federal Reserve gained more authority, the industry became riskier and more concentrated.

President makes the smart call for reforming housing finance system

Published in The Hill.

In a recent White House memorandum, President Trump said, “It is time for the United States to reform its housing finance system.” He is right about that. He is also right about principal elements of reform, as listed in the memorandum, notably reducing taxpayer risks, expanding the role of the private sector, establishing “appropriate” capital requirements for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, providing that the government is properly paid for its credit support of Fannie and Freddie, facilitating competition, addressing the systemic risk of Fannie and Freddie, defining what role they should have in multifamily mortgage finance, and terminating their conservatorships only when the other reforms are put in place.

In all this, the Treasury is instructed to distinguish between what can be done by administrative action and what would require legislation. This seems to set the stage for carrying out the former, even if Congress cannot agree on the latter, which it probably cannot. The memorandum provides that for “each administrative reform,” the Treasury housing reform plan will include a “timeline for implementation.” This timetable instruction represents a pretty clear declaration of intent to proceed.

Needless to say, the general directions can only be implemented after being turned into specifics. While that seems impossible for Congress to agree on, the executive branch can define the specific administrative actions it wishes to take. As the administration comes to decisions about the details, is there an appropriate model to consider for Fannie and Freddie? Is there some way to simplify thinking about the issues they present, which entails swarms of lobbying interests?

I think there is. The model should be too big to fail and systemically important financial institutions. Fannie is bigger than JPMorgan Chase. Freddie is bigger than Citigroup. There is no doubt Fannie and Freddie remain too big to fail. They are an essential point of vulnerability of American residential mortgage finance, the biggest credit market in the world except for Treasury debt. Should they implode, the government will again rush to the rescue of their global and domestic creditors.

Vast intellectual and political efforts have gone into lowering the odds that too big to fail banks will need bailouts or generate systemic crisis. We need to apply the results of that effort to Fannie and Freddie, which now run with virtually no capital. But before the crisis, they already ran at extreme leverage. Indeed, they leveraged up the whole housing finance system, making the system, as well as themselves, much riskier.

What about their capital requirements? Following our model, simply apply the risk based capital standards of systemically important banks to Fannie and Freddie. The same risks need the same capital, no matter who holds them. Fannie or Morgan? Freddie or Citi? The same risk and the same risk based capital. This would result in a required capital for the two on the order of $200 billion, or about $190 billion more than they have.

How much should they pay the government for its credit support? The same as the too big to fail banks pay. For them, this is called a deposit insurance premium. For Fannie and Freddie, you could call it a credit support fee, which would replace the profit sweep in their deal with the Treasury. Deposit insurance fees are assessed on total bank liabilities. Apply the same to Fannie and Freddie credit support fee and at the same level as would be required for a giant bank of equivalent riskiness.

I estimate this would be about 0.18 percent per year, but recommend the administration ask the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to run its big bank model on Fannie and Freddie and report on what level of fee results. Note that the Treasury stands behind the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, just as it stands behind Fannie and Freddie.

With such a serious amount of capital, Fannie and Freddie would need to charge guarantee fees that would allow greater competition in the private sector. This would be consistent with the law, which requires that their guarantee fees be set at levels that would cover the cost of capital of private regulated financial institutions. If they have the same risk based capital requirement, then that should follow for Fannie and Freddie.

With $200 billion in capital and a credit support fee of 0.18 percent, I estimate that Fannie and Freddie could sustain a return on total capital of 8 percent or so, which is quite satisfactory. The Treasury should exercise its warrants for about 80 percent of their common stock to share in this return until Treasury sells the stock, which will generate a large gain for the taxpayers. It seems to me that virtually all of this might be done by administrative action. Let us hope the administration will proceed apace.

Ten years later, the U.S. is still debating Fannie and Freddie

Published in Housing Finance International.

The giant U.S. government-guaranteed mortgage companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were and are unique features of American housing finance compared to other countries. In the days before their 2008 fall into insolvency and government conservatorship, which also saw their previously feared political power fizzle, Fannie and Freddie used to claim they were “the envy of the world.” In those days, they could always get many members of the U.S. Congress to repeat that claim, even though it wasn’t true.

But Fannie and Freddie were huge and still are – their combined 2018 total assets are $5.5 trillion. (This amount is about the same as the combined GDPs of the United Kingdom and France.) Fannie and Freddie were, and continue to be, dominant factors in U.S. housing finance markets. But they remain in government conservatorship more than 10 years after the collapse of the housing bubble they helped inflate and after the government bailed them out. Even after more than 10 years of debating, the government can’t figure out what to do with them next. All kinds of plans have been proposed by various politicians, trade associations, financial commentators, think tanks and investors. None has been adopted. The amount of talk has been vast, but no agreed-upon path has emerged out of the fog of endless debate.

The central problem is this: Fannie and Freddie have always been dependent on the guarantee of their obligations by the U.S. government. The guarantee was said to be “implicit,” but it was absolutely real, as events proved. Based on this guarantee, they sold trillions of dollars of bonds and mortgage-backed securities around the world. They never could have done this without their credit support from the government, and when they failed, the government protected the buyers. Although there is still not a formal guarantee, their backing by the government is even more indubitable now, since the U.S. Treasury has agreed to put in enough new senior preferred stock to keep the net worth of each from falling below zero.

Before the housing bubble shriveled, Fannie and Freddie did have some capital of their own, though a small amount relative to their obligations. In 2006, before their fall, they had combined total equity of $66 billion. That may sound significant, but it was to support assets plus outstanding guarantees already totaling $5.5 trillion, giving them a capital ratio of a risible 1.2 percent. In other words, they were leveraged 83 to 1. Such was the advantage of being darlings of the government. To get up to international risk-based capital standards, I calculate they would then have needed $90 billion more in capital than they had.

Now, 10 years after their government bailout, their combined equity is $10.7 billion, giving them a capital ratio of a mere 0.2 percent. In other words, their capital rounds to zero, and their leverage is 514 to one. To meet international standards, they would now require an additional $124 billion in capital. Without capital, Fannie and Freddie at this point rely not just in large measure, but utterly and completely, on their government guarantee. Indeed, they could not stay in business for even one more minute without it, and this has continued for 10 years.

In good times, running on the government’s credit can be very profitable, and so Fannie and Freddie have been, following the recovery of U.S. house prices which began in 2012. Why have they not built up any capital at all since then? Well, in that same year, the U.S. Treasury Department and the conservator for Fannie and Freddie (the Federal Housing Finance Agency), agreed that each quarter, essentially all of the profits of Fannie and Freddie would be paid to the Treasury, thence going to offset the federal deficit.

This agreement between two parts of the government that the government would take all the profits until further notice has been viewed as unfair and illegal by investors in the common and junior preferred stocks of Fannie and Freddie, which continue to exist. Hedge fund investors, employing top legal talent, have generated various lawsuits against the government, none of which has succeeded.

It is essential to understand the most important macro effect of Fannie and Freddie. This was and is to run up the leverage and therefore the risk of the entire mortgage and housing sectors. Thanks to them, the aggregate leverage of the system is much higher than would otherwise have been possible, and house prices get inflated relative to incomes and down payments. As this leveraging proceeds, it shifts more and more of the risk of mortgage credit from the lenders and from private capital to the government and to the taxpayers. Fannie and Freddie did and do create major systemic risk.

This sounds like a bad idea, and it is. But once the government has gotten itself deeply committed to such a scheme, and the mortgage and housing sectors have gotten used to enjoying the credit subsidy and economic rents involved, it is very hard to change.

Numerous important interest groups benefit from Fannie and Freddie’s running up the systemic leverage and risk. These include:

• Homebuilders, who benefit from more easily selling bigger and more profitable houses.

• Realtors, who likewise profit when selling houses is made easier and get bigger commissions when house prices rise.

• Wall Street firms, whose business of selling mortgage-related securities around the world is easier and bigger when they have government guaranteed bonds to sell.

• Banks, who have become organized to make mortgage loans and pass the credit risk to the government.

• Mortgage banks, who do not have the capital to hold loans themselves and likewise can pass the risk to somebody else.

• Municipal governments, who like the higher real estate taxes generated by high property prices.

• Investors in mortgages who don’t want to have to worry about credit risk because the taxpayers have it instead.

• Affordable housing groups, who get subsidies from Fannie and Freddie.

• Politicians, whose constituents and contributors include the aforementioned groups.

This daunting Gordian knot of private and political interests, all of whom get advantages from the economic distortions of Fannie and Freddie, all of which are always busy lobbying or being lobbied, makes it highly unlikely that the currently divided Congress will do any better at reform than its predecessors of the last decade. My own view is that the probability of meaningful legislation for Fannie and Freddie over the next year is zero.

But a different source of change is now a frequent subject of discussion and speculation. This is direct administrative action by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the U.S. Treasury. The FHFA has a new director coming, Mark Calabria, nominated by President Donald Trump and apparently headed for confirmation by the Senate. Mr. Calabria has deep experience in the issues of Fannie and Freddie and might use his wide powers as their conservator and regulator for reform, including renegotiating their bailout deal with the Treasury.

Two essential reform items are putting Fannie and Freddie’s capital requirements on the same basis as every other too-big-to-fail financial institution; and making them pay a fair price to the government for its ongoing credit support. This should be in line with what all the big banks have to pay for deposit insurance, which is their form of government guarantee.

Might such things happen by administrative action? They might. But not without a lot of lobbying, arguing and complaining by all of the interest groups listed above.

We can’t help feeling that we today are smarter

Published in the Financial Times.

Martin Wolf is certainly correct that “further financial crises are inevitable” (March 20). Let me add one more reason why this is so — another procyclical factor rooted in human nature. This is the intellectual egotism of the present time: the conviction we can’t help feeling that we are smarter than people in the past were, smarter than those old bankers, regulators, economists and politicians of past cycles, and that therefore we will make fewer mistakes. We aren’t and we won’t. The intellectual egotists of the future will condescendingly look back on us in their turn.

Over a century, which years were inflation-control champions and which booby-prize winners?

Published by the R Street Institute.

How much can the rate of inflation move around? A lot.

The Consumer Price Index (CPI) began in 1913, the same year the Federal Reserve was created. The CPI’s path over the 106 years since then displays notable variations in inflation — or alternately stated, in the rate of depreciation of the purchasing power of the U.S. dollar. In this post, I consider the average inflation rates during successive 10-year and five-year periods, starting in 1913. (The very last period, 2013-2018, includes six years.) I also note the context of historical events. Wars, especially, induce accelerated government money-printing, but the history displays constant inflation since 1933, sometimes slower, sometimes much faster.

Which decades and half-decades are the inflation-control champions, meaning the lowest average inflation rate without descending into serious deflation?  The decade champion is that of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, 1953-1962. Its average inflation rate was 1.31 percent.

The booby prize goes to 1973-1982, when inflation averaged the awful rate of 8.67 percent per year. No wonder Arthur Burns, who was chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1970 to 1978, afterward gave a speech entitled “The Anguish of Central Banking.” In second place for the booby prize is 1913-1922, with an average inflation rate of 5.60 percent. That was the result of the first World War. The decade included, first, double-digit inflation then a short, very sharp depression in 1921-1922, but high inflation overall.

The inflation-control champion among half-decades is 1923-27, during the boom of the “Coolidge Prosperity,” when inflation averaged only 0.47 percent. In second place is 1953-57 at 1.24 percent. At that time, William McChesney Martin, who considered inflation “a thief in the night,” was chairman of the Fed.

Table 1 shows the record by 10-year periods in chronological order. It also shows what $1 at the beginning of each period was worth in purchasing power at the end of each 10 years. The last column shows what $1 in 1913 was worth in purchasing power, as it depreciated over the entire 106 years.

Table 2 shows the five-years periods, this time in order of lowest average inflation to highest, with historical notes on the context. It contrasts the lowest third of the observations with the highest third.

The average annual inflation over the 106 years was 3.11 percent. That reduced the $1 of 1913 to about 4 cents by the end of 2018, as shown in Graph 1. Note that, because of the scale of the graph, the change looks smaller in recent decades, but it isn’t. For example, the drop in purchasing power from 1983 to 2013 is the same as that from 1943 to 1973—about 60 percent in 30 years in each case.

Many central banks, including the Federal Reserve, now believe in perpetual inflation of 2 percent. Had that inflation rate been maintained since 1913, instead of the actual 3.11 percent, the dollar’s purchasing power from then to now would have followed the dashed line on the graph and fallen to 12 cents, instead of 4 cents.

We know from history that big wars will always be financed, in part, by depreciation of the currency of the winners, while the losers’ currencies will often be wiped out. There were several wars in addition to the two world wars in the 106 years under consideration, but was the constant inflation since 1933 necessary? Perhaps there was no other way for the government to deal with the debt automatically produced when taxes are forever less than government expenditures, war or no war, and the Federal Reserve is always there to help the Treasury out by monetizing its debt.

Thanks to Daniel Semelsberger for research assistance.

Comments/ RIN 2590-AA98: Validation and Approval of Credit Score Models by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Published by the R Street Institute.

On behalf of National Taxpayers Union, R Street Institute, Citizens Against Government Waste, Institute for Liberty and Taxpayers Protection Alliance (“the undersigned”), we respectfully submit these comments to the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) concerning its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the validation and approval of credit score models. The undersigned are pleased to comment in favor of the proposed rule, which we believe represents a fair and reasonable interpretation of section 310 of the “Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018.” Our organizations have long been involved in financial services issues and are prominent voices on housing finance matters. Importantly, we all follow the same housing policy fundamentals: a system that promotes broad access to credit for qualified borrowers, a significant private capital buffer, and administrative actions that promote competitive markets and protect taxpayers.

Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the GSEs) were placed into conservatorship more than a decade ago, our organizations have called for Congressional and administrative actions to mitigate taxpayer exposure to risky activity. Taxpayers have expressed concern about greatly expanded GSEs activities in the private market while enjoying the unique competitive advantages of government backing. With the GSEs having more than $5 trillion of mortgage risk on their extremely leveraged balance sheets, which are by extension underwritten by taxpayers, the federal government holds a considerable level of risk.

Economists widely agree that the significant increase in housing foreclosures that fueled the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent recession was a result of a weakening of GSE mortgage standards through affordable housing goals. These goals required the GSEs meet annual quotas of low- and moderate-income mortgages. As time went on and the number of prime borrowers dried up, the GSEs had to expand operations in the subprime market in order to meet their annual quotas. As the market shrank, the GSEs found it harder and harder to find creditworthy borrowers causing them to lower their standards to meet their affordable housing goals. This involved either reducing the accepted credit score, lowering the required down payment, raising the debt-to-income ratio, or accepting low or no documentation.

Accepting lower credit standards certainly expanded the number of people who were eligible for a mortgage, but it allowed a greater number of under-qualified borrowers to obtain a loan who would have otherwise been denied such a large line of credit. Once defaults skyrocketed and the housing bubble burst, the GSEs were wired more than $190 billion from taxpayers to keep them afloat and were placed into conservatorship where they remain to this day.

If there is one lesson from the 2008 housing crisis that should have been learned, it is that overly ambitious affordable housing goals and the rush to qualify numerous borrowers by any means can put the economy, and taxpayers, at great risk. GSEs utilize credit scores in several ways including benchmarks for risk fees, loan eligibility guidelines, and (for Freddie Mac) one of many attributes in making a credit assessment. They are also used internally to balance counterparty risk, an often-overlooked but very important role. Thus, allowing new credit score models into the GSE framework could have major consequences for their operations, their risk, and in turn taxpayer liabilities.

Such consequences would also reverberate throughout the private sector, as lenders, loan servicers, mortgage insurers, and other parts of the industry would face all manner compliance and implementation costs. New credit scoring methods in the GSEs could also eventually spill over into taxpayer-backed lending programs at the Federal Housing Administration, the Small Business Administration, and other agencies. In an environment where GSEs and FHA appear to be more heavily weighting their portfolios with higher-risk loans, the introduction of new credit scores could even affect the overall systemic risk calculation at an especially delicate point in financial markets. These factors are discussed in greater detail in a Policy Paper that National Taxpayers Union filed separately with FHFA.

It is of particular concern to free market, limited government groups to see how the “Credit Score Competition Act,” included as Section 310 of S. 2155, “the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act” that passed in 2018, will be implemented. Section 310 directs FHFA to create a process for evaluating new credit scoring models for use by the GSEs but does not mandate they accept more just one type of credit score. We believe FHFA interpreted the legislative text in a careful and thoughtful manner that complies with legislative intent. The proposed rule issues standards for compliance, which sets forth several factors that must be considered in the validation and approval process, including the credit score model’s integrity, reliability, and accuracy, its historical record of predicting borrower and credit behaviors, and consistency of any model with GSE safety and soundness.

Further, FHFA rightly notes in the proposed rule that alternative scores may immediately gain a competitive advantage in the market. As such, the rule specifically “prohibits an Enterprise from approving any credit score model developed by a company that is related to a consumer data provider through any common ownership or control, of any type or amount.” In addition, the proposed rule not only calls for sound cost-benefit analysis in evaluating new models, it also builds in conflict-of-interest guardrails (which are standard in other regulatory spheres) to ensure that those models compete on a level playing field. This holds promise for creating a true market-driven competitive environment with an opportunity for innovation.

Additionally, we are supportive of the straightforward, four-step process which the Enterprises evaluate and implement alternative credit-scoring models. The process is summarized below:

1. Solicitation of applications from credit score model developers; Proposes that solicitation for new applications occur at least every seven years, or as determined necessary by FHFA.

2. Initial review of submitted applications;
   ● Each GSE would obtain the data from the data provider on behalf of the applicant.

3. Credit score assessment;
   ● During this assessment phase, each credit score model would be assessed for accuracy, reliability, and integrity.
   ● Approaches for assessing accuracy include: 1) Comparison-based. This approach will not require the applicant’s credit score to be more accurate than the existing credit score in use by the GSEs. This approach would be more subjective and indicate reasonableness of the credit score’s accuracy. 2) Champion-Challenger. The applicant’s credit score must be more accurate than the existing credit score in use by the GSEs. This would be a bright line test.

4. Enterprise business assessment;
   ● During this phase, a GSE would assess the credit score model in conjunction with the GSEs business systems and processes.
   ● In addition, the GSE must consider impacts on the mortgage finance industry, assess competitive effects, conduct a third-party vendor review, and any other evaluations established by the GSE.

The validation and approval process, which produces the resulting approved credit score model, must meet these five statutory requirements:

(i) satisfy minimum requirements of integrity, reliability, and accuracy; (ii) have a historical record of measuring and predicting default rates and other credit behaviors; (iii) be consistent with the safe and sound operation of the corporation; (iv) comply with any standards and criteria established by the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency under section 1328(1) of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992; and (v) satisfy any other requirements, as determined by the corporation.

Taxpayers have a significant stake in the housing finance market and FHFA must do everything in its power to ensure that taxpayer risk is mitigated to its fullest extent. The proposed rule will undoubtedly help to protect from a potential “race to the bottom” effect to qualify as many possible borrowers as possible through political manipulation of tools that are supposed to be reliable predictors of risk. Significant innovation in the credit scoring space is already occurring through the advent of refinements and expansions to existing standard tools, which themselves are being subjected to rigorous testing. We believe these modernizations can be balanced with the benefits of a stable, predictable system of lending and finance that measures and protects against risk, not only to borrowers and lenders, but also to taxpayers.

Thank you for the opportunity to offer our views on this proposed rule. We urge FHFA to adopt the rule as is and implement it in a timely manner.

Pete Sepp, President
National Taxpayers Union

Alex J. Pollock, Distinguished Senior Fellow
R Street Institute

Tom Schatz, President
Citizens Against Government Waste

David Williams, President
Taxpayers Protection Alliance

Andrew Langer, President
Institute for Liberty

The Fed Has Not Been Independent – Perhaps It Should Be Restructured

Published in The Heritage Foundation.

The Federalist Society recently posted a podcast of me and R-Street’s Alex Pollock discussing Federal Reserve independence. This topic is always fun because so many people assume that (1) the Federal Reserve should be independent; and, (2) the Federal Reserve has always been independent.

The Inescapably Political World of Banking and Finance

Published in Law & Liberty.

Banking always involves political economy, as professor Mark Rose observes, or as we might more precisely say, political finance. This is the central lesson of Rose’s Market Rules. The book nicely shows how banking and politics have been constantly intertwined in the United States over the 50 years beginning in the 1960s, as much bigger banks have been created and the banking system has consolidated. (Although today there are 5,477 banks and savings associations in the United States, in 1950 there were 19,438.)

The book’s anecdotes of forceful personalities of American banking history, both those in the business and those in government during the times it covers, are engaging, at least to those of us in the trade, and fun to read. In addition, its theme has much broader application than the text suggests: namely to all countries in all times. As banking scholars Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber have concluded, all banking systems reflect deals between bankers and politicians, which they call “the Game of Bank Bargains.” The study of this idea in their book, Fragile by Design—The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit(2014), covers a number of countries in detail and a long history going back to the 17th century. This gives us a wider framework in which to view the arguments and events related by Rose and reinforces his local variations on the theme that banking is politically entwined.

However, unlike Fragile by Design, don’t read Market Rules for economic or financial concepts or for careful economic or financial arguments. They aren’t there. Likewise, don’t read it for theoretical insights into politics or banking systems. Its discussion of political finance is journalistic, with a left-of-center slant. The book displays a pronounced bias against markets and competition, repeatedly dismissing them as “market talk.” “Citing markets” is characterized as a “rhetorical obsession.” There is throughout a positive bias for governments and for government control.  Discussing the financial crisis bailouts, for example, Rose reflects that “For that moment at least, government authority and prestige were in the ascendance”—just the way he likes it. Still, the book’s rendition of banking debates and developments is interesting and useful, describing how the economically critical banking sector evolved over five decades.

A more balanced view of banks and governments than the book conveys would stress that both banks and governments are made up of human beings, and that both demonstrate the aspirations, insights, and achievements always mixed with the failures, mistakes and hypocrisy natural to mankind. We should not be surprised that these same attributes appear in their interaction and the deals they make with each other. Moreover, both banks and governments often make big mistakes at forecasting the economic and financial future and cannot know what the long-term results of their own actions will be.

We naturally observe this mix of strengths and weaknesses in all parties in the course of banking history. Nothing human is perfect, or even close. The pursuit of profit, subject to competition and innovation, will on average get much better economic results for the people than will the pursuit of bureaucratic power using the government’s monopoly of force and coercion. Rose is right, however, that in banking we always find some combination of the two.

Market Rules brings out in what remarkable fashion banking times and ideas change, and how what seems like a great issue at one point, becomes difficult to remember at some later point. In discussing the Hunt Commission, appointed by President Richard Nixon to consider how to improve the American financial system, the book says:

Hunt and his commissioners determined not to explore in detail the boldest question of all, which is whether the nation needed a separate and distinct group of S&Ls [savings and loans] and another group of separate and distinct commercial banks.

That was the boldest question of all? It seems hard for us to believe, but in 1970, the S&Ls were a political force to be reckoned with. They had their own powerful trade association, the U.S. League for Savings, and their own cheerleading regulator, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Those names are probably unfamiliar, because both have long since disappeared and been merged into the respective banking organizations. Of course, at the time of this debate, the 1980s collapse of the S&L industry was more than a decade in the future.

The Hunt Commission did propose numerous reforms, but “criticism of Hunt’s report arrived hard and fast,” Rose relates. One of the commissioners arose “to denounce the ‘blurring of distinctions between financial institutions.’” “Blurring of distinctions” hardly sounds like a stirring battle cry, or even a clear thought, but since it really meant “protect me from competition,” it was.

A similar thought arose in the 1990s: “Large and small bankers alike feared that insurance companies like State Farm would purchase a thrift [S&L] charter and use it to offer bank services.” In Rose’s phrase, this was a “horrifying prospect.” By now, State Farm has operated its S&L, which is called State Farm Bank, for two decades. I have an account there. It doesn’t seem too horrifying.

Another big battle of past years was that over the then well-known “one-quarter point.” To any readers under the age of 50: does that mean anything to you? Probably not. The context is that in the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. government practiced national price fixing for the interest rates that banks and S&Ls could pay on deposits. The point of this 1930s idea was to limit competition, so that deposit banking was a cartel with the government as cartel manager. The “quarter point” meant that the price fixing rules allowed the maximum rate the S&Ls could pay to be 0.25 percent higher than what commercial banks could pay their depositors.

As the book relates, “Insiders knew the government’s ability to determine interest rates paid to savers by its official name, the Federal Reserve’s Regulation Q,” commenting that it was “curiously named.” So it was, but famous in banking at the time. I well remember an old banking lawyer explaining to me that “Reg Q,” as it was called, was a permanent and unchangeable part of the American banking system. A bad prediction, as it turned out, since Reg Q has now disappeared from the memory of all but financial historians. Nonetheless it was a big deal in its day.

The book further explains: “In 1966, President Johnson and the Congress approved the Interest Rate Control Act, which authorized S&L executives to pay a higher rate of interest to savers than banks paid them. Nervous S&L officers had urged this action.” Rose does not mention that they had urged it because the government’s interest-rate fixing had brought on the Credit Crunch of 1966. “Federal Reserve officers in turn approved a 0.25 percent differential.” Then S&Ls were “passionate in defending the regulation…as a vital protection to their firms and to American home construction.”

Passionate? Vital? A quarter-point? Reg Q? Times change.

One of the most instructive examples of intertwined finance and government is the history of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Fannie and Freddie played a large role in inflating the disastrous housing bubble of the 2000s. The most important thing about them is that they were government-sponsored, government-promoted and government guaranteed, while having their stock privately owned—a fundamental conflict which turned out to have bankrupting results. Fannie and Freddie were known by the acronym, “GSEs,” for “government-sponsored enterprises.” In 2008, they also became majority government-owned.

But in its less than one-page treatment of them, Market Rules describes Fannie and Freddie as “privately owned firms,” without mentioning their GSE status or the tight political connections and political clout they enjoyed in their glory days. Fannie was a Washington bully, including attacking the individual careers of those who dared to criticize or oppose them, and inspired genuine fear. James Johnson, its 1990s CEO and a highly influential political insider and operator, presided over a huge institution which seemed at the time an unstoppable colossus, both financial and political. Although he is a most impressive example of its main thesis, he rates not even a mention in the book.

Many other interesting characters do appear. Featured roles are given to James Saxon, William McChesney Martin, Wright Patman, Walter Wriston, Arthur Burns, Bill Simon, Hugh McColl, Don Regan, Gene Ludwig, Robert Rubin, Phil Gramm, Sandy Weill, Paul Volcker. If you are interested in political finance but you don’t know who all these gentlemen are, you should. Also appearing is a whole series of U.S. presidents from John Kennedy on.

Of everybody in this history, my favorite is James Saxon, the comptroller of the currency from 1961-1966, who on Rose’s telling got the whole ball rolling of introducing more competition into a financial system previously designed to suppress competition.

“Saxon, often intemperate in his public language,” Rose writes, “asserted that investment bankers’ control of revenue bonds constituted a ‘full-fledged monopoly.’” To be exact, it was an oligopoly, but of course Saxon was basically right.

“In March 1964, Saxon told members of the Senate Banking Committee that the Federal Reserve’s regulation of the interest rates that banks paid savers amounted to price fixing.” Rose comments primly, “Presidential appointees did not speak in that fashion about the Federal Reserve.” My reaction is, “Saxon was absolutely right!”

Being right may not be popular: Saxon “had thrown state-chartered bankers into a more competitive environment, which they resisted.” And Saxon had “encouraged powerful enemies” who demanded his ouster. Rose does not like him either and writes with satisfaction of how President Lyndon Johnson declined to reappoint him in 1966, so that “Saxon returned to anonymity.” Like we all do, but it seems to me he had a great run.

In conclusion, as this book illustrates with lots of examples, political finance it is.

When my successor as president of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago asked me for advice, I told him, “Remember that this job is 50 percent banking and 50 percent politics.” That seems to sum it up.

Fed ‘independence’ is a slippery slope

Published in American Banker, The Federalist Society, The American Conservative, and Live Trendy News.

Many observers, like Captain Renault in Casablanca, were “shocked, shocked!” at President Trump’s sharp criticism of the Federal Reserve and his attempt to influence it against raising interest rates, inquiring whether the president can fire the Fed chairman.

Yet many presidents and their administrations have pressured the Fed, going back to its earliest days, when the Woodrow Wilson administration urged it to finance bonds for the American participation in the First World War. The Fed compliantly did so, proving itself very useful to the U.S. Treasury.

That was not surprising, since the original Federal Reserve Act made the Secretary of the Treasury automatically the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and the board met in the Treasury Department.

In the decades since then, lots of presidents have worked to influence the Fed’s actions. Their purpose was usually to prevent the Fed from raising interest rates, exactly like Trump. It was also often to cause the Fed to finance the U.S. Treasury and to keep down the cost of government debt, just as “quantitative easing” does now.
But has a president ever fired a Federal Reserve Board chairman?

Yes, in fact. President Truman effectively fired Fed Chairman Thomas McCabe in 1951. “McCabe was informed that his services were no longer satisfactory, and he quit,” Truman said. Being informed by the president that your performance is not satisfactory is being fired, I’d say. One might argue that McCabe didn’t have to resign, but he did.

The background to McCabe’s departure was a heated and very public dispute between the Truman administration, including Truman personally, and the Fed about interest rates and financing the Korean War. Truman had even summoned the entire Federal Reserve Open Market Committee to the White House, where he made plain what he wanted, which was straightforward. Since the Second World War, the Fed, as the servant of the Treasury, bought however many Treasury bonds it took to keep their interest rate steady at 2.5% — this was the “peg.” In the middle of the Korean War, Truman understandably wanted to continue it.

The Fed, on the other hand, was understandably worried about building inflation, and wanted to raise interest rates. As the two sides debated in January 1951, American military forces were going backwards down the Korean peninsula, in agonizing retreat before the onslaught of the Chinese army. Although financial historians always tell this story favoring the Fed, I have a lot of sympathy for Truman.

By now we have been endlessly instructed, especially by the Fed itself, that the Fed is and must be “independent,” and this has become an article of faith, especially for many economists. However, the opposite opinion has often been prominent, including when the Fed and the Treasury completely coordinated their actions during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 — as they should have.

What exactly does Fed “independence” mean? Allan Sproul, a long-time and influential president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, maintained that the Fed “is independent within the government.” That is masterfully ambiguous. It expresses a tension between the executive branch, Congress and the Fed, searching for an undefined political balance.

When McCabe resigned, Truman appointed, he thought, his own man, William McChesney Martin from the Treasury Department. Martin is often viewed as the hero of establishing Fed independence — correspondingly, Truman later considered him a “traitor.” But Martin’s understanding of what Fed “independence” means was complex: He “was always careful to frame his arguments in terms of independence from the executive branch, not from Congress,” a history of Fed leadership says.

“It is clear to me that it was intended the Federal Reserve should be independent and not responsible to the executive branch of the Government, but should be accountable to Congress,” Martin testified in 1951. “I like to think of a trustee relationship to see that the Treasury does not engage in the natural temptation to depreciate the currency.”

Seven decades later, how accountability to Congress should work is still not clear, and Martin would certainly be surprised that the current Fed has formally committed itself to the perpetual depreciation of the currency at 2% per year.

Martin stayed as Fed chairman until 1970, which allowed him to experience pressure from five different administrations. The most memorable instance was the personal pressure applied by President Johnson. In late 1965, the Fed raised interest rates with the war in Vietnam, domestic spending and government deficits expanding.

“Johnson summoned the Fed Chairman to his Texas ranch and physically shoved him around his living room, yelling in his face, ‘Boys are dying in Vietnam and Bill Martin doesn’t care!’” one history relates.

That’s quite a scene to imagine.

One may wonder whether Fed independence is a technical or a political question. It is political. The nature and behavior of money is always political, no matter how much technical effort at measuring and modeling economic factors there may be.

For example, the Fed over the last decade systematically took money away from savers and gave it to leveraged speculators by enforcing negative real interest rates. Taking money from some people to give it to others is a political act. That is why the Fed, like every other part of the government, should exist in a network of checks and balances and accountability.

There is also a fundamental problem of knowledge involved in the idea of independence. How much faith should one put in the judgments of the Fed, which are actually guesses? The answer is very little — about as much faith as in any other bunch of economic forecasts, given that the Fed’s record is as poor as everybody else’s. The Fed’s judgments are guesses by sophisticated, intelligent and serious people, but nonetheless guesses about an unknowable future.

Arthur Burns, the Fed chairman from 1970 to 1978, observed that among the reasons for “The Anguish of Central Banking” is that “in a rapidly changing world the opportunities for making mistakes are legion. Even facts about current conditions are often subject to misinterpretation.”

Very true — and moreover, the world is always changing.

In the light of the political reality of Federal Reserve history, a completely independent Fed looks impossible. In the light of the unknowable future, it looks undesirable.

The Fed Has Not Been Independent – Perhaps It Should Be Restructured

Published in Forbes.

The Federalist Society recently posted a podcast of me and R-Street’s Alex Pollock discussing Federal Reserve independence. This topic is always fun because so many people assume that (1) the Federal Reserve should be independent; and, (2) the Federal Reserve has always been independent.

Fannie And Freddie Need More Capital

Published in Forbes.

Another reason for ending the sweep would be that the Treasury has already been paid back its $187.5 billion injection plus the 10% compound dividend payments required under the terms of the conservatorship. Any GSE revenues flowing to Treasury exceeds what it is rightfully owed, and accomplishes little else that could be construed as positive.