The New Bank Bailout
Taxpayers are covering Federal Reserve losses, for which member banks are supposed to be liable.
Published in the Wall Street Journal with Paul H. Kupiec.
Taxpayers are bailing out Federal Reserve member banks—institutions that own the stock of the Fed’s 12 district banks—and hardly anyone has noticed. For more than 100 years, our central-banking system has made a profit and reliably remitted funds to the U.S. Treasury. Those days are gone. Sharp rate hikes have made the interest the Fed pays on its deposits and borrowing much higher than the yield it receives on its trillions in long-term investments. Since September 2022, its expenses have greatly exceeded its interest earnings. It has accumulated nearly $93 billion in cash operating losses and made no such remittances.
The Fed is able to assess member banks for these losses, but it has instead borrowed to fund them, shifting the bill to taxpayers by raising the consolidated federal debt. That tab is growing larger by the week. Under generally accepted accounting principles, the Fed has $86 billion in negative retained earnings, bringing its total capital to around negative $50 billion.
Each of the Fed’s 12 district banks, except Atlanta, has suffered large operating losses. Accumulated operating losses in the New York, Chicago, Dallas and Richmond, Va., district banks have more than consumed their capital, making each deeply insolvent. A fifth district bank, Boston, is teetering on insolvency. At the current rate of loss, five others will face insolvency within a year and the taxpayers’ bill will grow by more than $9 billion a month until interest rates decline or the Fed imposes a capital call or assessments on its member banks.
The Federal Reserve Act requires that member banks subscribe to the shares issued by their district bank in a dollar value equal to 6% of a member institution’s “capital” and “surplus”—the definitions of which depend on the depository institution’s charter. Member banks must pay for half their subscribed shares, while the remaining half of the subscription is subject to call by the board.
The act empowers the Fed to compel member banks to contribute additional funds to cover their district reserve bank operating losses up to an amount equal to the value of their membership subscription. The provision reads: “The shareholders of every Federal reserve bank shall be held individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another, for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such bank to the extent of the amount subscriptions to such stock at the par value thereof in addition to the amount subscribed, whether such subscriptions have been paid up in whole or in part” (emphasis added).
In the century when district banks were reliably profitable, these provisions posed only a remote risk to Fed shareholders. The central bank didn’t need member banks to make any additional contributions. As district banks’ consolidated losses approach $100 billion, however, the risks to Fed stockholders have risen. If called on, member banks are legally responsible to make these payments. At a minimum, they should disclose this potential liability.
The risk is that the more than 1,400 Fed-shareholder banks could receive a call on their resources equal to as much as 9% of their capital and surplus—a call for a 3% additional equity investment and 6% cash payment to offset district bank losses. Member banks could be on the hook to contribute three times the capital they currently own in their district bank, or $108 billion in total for the central-bank system.
The Securities and Exchange Commission requires every registered firm to include in its annual 10K reports “an explanation of its off-balance sheet arrangements.” The provision applies to securities issued by banks and bank holding companies that are traded on national exchanges, but enforcement is delegated to the federal regulatory agencies that aren’t requiring Fed member banks and their holding companies to disclose the Fed’s contingent resource claim as a material risk or as a contingent liability.
Consider the Goldman Sachs Group, which includes at least two Fed member banks. The company’s 10K for 2022 includes page after page devoted to discussion of the group’s regulatory, market, competition, operational, sustainability and climate-change risks. Not included in that list is the risk of being compelled to recapitalize and share in the losses of its Fed district banks.
The larger of the two is a member of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, a district bank with accumulated losses of nearly $62 billion, or more than four times its $15 billion stated capital. A smaller Goldman Sachs Trust bank is a member of the Philadelphia Fed, a bank with $821 million in accumulated losses.
Goldman’s member banks had almost $44 billion in capital and surplus, according to our analysis of its June regulatory-call report data. Applying the 3% equity-investment and 6% cash-payment requirements, we calculate that Goldman would face a maximum contingent call of approximately $4 billion—a sum that would exceed the combined 2022 income of its two Fed member banks.
Those sums aren’t mere rounding errors, and they shouldn’t be placed on taxpayers’ tab. Federal bank regulators should require Fed member banks that are registered with the SEC and their holding companies to disclose their risks of being called on to prop up the finances of their Federal Reserve district banks.